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By W. D. L.
MUST A SOCIAL CLUB TAKE OUT A LICENSE?
THE annotation by Mr. LONGSTRETH in this number
of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW on the
case of Com. v. Tierney,' shows the conflict of opinion in
the courts of different States on the question whether a bona
fide club is obliged, under the liquor laws, to take out a license
before it can sell liquor to its members. In all the States we
have Acts requiring that no one shall sell liquor without a
license. The word sale itself appears in the license laws of
almost every State in the Union. It would naturally suggest
itself to any one looking at this subject for the first time, that
the terms of the statutes should be interpreted in accordance
with the general purpose of the Act. This purpose, which
the judge must gather from the provisions, of the statutes
taken as a whole, is the key by which alone the meaning
of each section can be interpreted. And yet if we examine
the opinion in the cases upholding the view that a club can-
not sell to its members without a license, we find them
almost entirely taken up with the question whether the act
of the steward of a club, in handing a member a glass of
wine, the member paying money therefor, is technically a
sale.2 In fact, the universal attitude of the Appellate
Courts, which have held that a club must take out a license,
has been, that the whole question hangs on the decision of
-what is technically a sale. And though one judge has
-taken the trouble to point out that the purpose of the license
1.i; I Supra, p. 861.
2 State v. Easton, 2o At. Rep. (Md.), 782 (1890); State v. Essex Club
20 At. Rep. (N. J.), 769 (i8go); People v. Andrews, 115 N. Y., 427 (1889);
Kas. v. Horacek, 41 Kas. 87 (1889); State v. Lockyear, 95 N. C., 633
(1886); Martin v. State, 59 Ala., 35 (1877); Rickart v. People, 79 Il., 85
(871); State z'. Mercer, 32 Iowa, 4o5 (1871).
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laws would be defeated if men were allowed to form them-
selves into clubs and sell liquor to each other, even he has
omitted critically to discuss the real purpose of the license
laws.'
There is only one thing more remarkable than this
picking out of a particular word in a statute, and defining
its technical legal meaning, and that is, that any one who
adopted this attitude toward the license laws, should have
arrived at the conclusion that a change of ownership for a
money consideration between the club and an individual.
member was not a sale. Yet this was what was done by
'an English judge, Judge FIELD, in Graff v. Evans.2  The-
learned judge held that the sale to a member was only a
transfer of special property in the goods and not a sale. In
other words, that the act of changing, my ownership from
one-tenth or one-hundredth interest in a subject of prop-
erty, as a "tenant in common" with my co-members, to a
complete ownership for a money consideration is not a sale.
The reasoning which led to such a conclusion was easily
picked to pieces by the American judges,' and it therefore
rather adds to than detracts from the strength of the opinion
that a club cannot sell without a license.' The sale of wine
to a member of a club has been compared to a sale to
the stockholder of a railroad company of a ticket on the
train. As far as the technical question of sale is concerned,
we are unable to see any distinction between them.
Indeed, if the club is incorporated there is not even an
apparent difference between the sale by the corporation
organized for pleasure to its members, and the corporation
organized for profit to its members. When, however, the
club is a mere association or partnership there may be some
I Opinion of Judge PZNNVPACKR, Comm. v. Tierney, i Dist. Rep.,
17 (1892). This opinion contains the best and fullest statement of the
position that clubs cannot sell liquor without a license.
2 L. R. 8 Q. B., D., 373 (i88i).
3 See especially opinion of VAN SYcKEL, J., in State v. Essex Club,.
20 At. Rep. (N. J.), 769 (1896).
4 Opinion of P9NNYPACKUR, J., in Comm. v. Tierney, i Dist. Rep.,
17 (1892).
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apparent difference. If the members are partners in the
liquor consumed by the members no action for the price of
the liquor will lie at common law. Practically, the only
method of recovery would be by bill in equity for an
account and distribution of the assets of the partnership.
But though ,a learned judge has intimated to the writer
that the fact that a club was incorporated might make a
difference in his decision, should the case come before him,
it does not appear to us that an accident of practice-and,
the rule that one partner cannot sue another is nothing but
an accident of practice-should affect this question of
"what is a sale." Incorporated or unincorporated, in both
cases there is a passage of title for a money consideration;
in both cases the drinker exchanges a title giving him
qualified rights to a fractional undivided part of the whole
stock, to a title giving him complete control over a par-
ticular glass of liquor.
But the primary questions are-first, what is the object
of our State license laws? and second, what is the method
or methods by which this object is sought to be attained?
The object, of course, is to discourage intemperance. The
method by which this ultimate object is attained, which is,
of course, the important point, can be seen both from what
the statutes do make criminal, as well as from what they
prescribe.
Now, a man can drink himself drunk as often as he
wants to in the strictest prohibition State in the Union.
The open drunkenness may be a misdemeanor, but the act
of drinking liquor never. Neither does any State attempt
to regulate the place where a man can drink. One can
drink a glass of beer in a street in Boisee City with as
much respect for the letter and spirit of any law of the
State of Iowa as one could in a bar-room in New York
City. But the license laws and the prohibition laws do
attempt to restrain the business of liquor selling. Many
statutes contain the words, "trading in liquors . . . by
selling the same." And we doubt not that any of the courts
which now hold clubs must have licenses would convict a
man of "selling liquors" under the acts who bartered wine
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for groceries, though according to BENJAMIN, bartering'is
not a sale.'
Now the criterion of a business is that the conduct of it
is for profit; actual profit is not necessary, but that profit
was the direct or indirect object proves that the transaction
is a business transaction. It is the business of the retail
sale of liquor without a license which our Licensing Acts
mean to prohibit.
The question, then, is: Do clubs engage in the busi-
ness of selling liquor? It seems to us that the subject of
clubs and the license laws will never be cleared of the
doubts which now hang about it until we clearly under-
stand the difference between a club and company or busi-
ness corporation. A club is an organization for the purpose
of giving its members certain things at cost. A company
is an association for the purpose of profit, which profit, in
the shape of money, is handed over to the members accord-
ing to the relative amount of capital they have contributed.
To make my meaning clear: The managing board of a
club agrees to furnish its members with things they can
enjoy in common, such as a house, chairs and books, at an
assessed valuation of so much a year, and food, drink, etc.,
whicb the members of course cannot enjoy in common, at
a set price for a definite quantity. Now it is true that
money may be made off food and lost in drink, or vice
versa, but on the average the total pleasures which a man
gets out of his club cost the association, as a whole, exactly
what he pays for them. This being the principle of a club,
and no member being interested in the amount of another
member's expenditures at his club, no club transactions
between its members can by any ingenuity be termed
" carrying on a business," though there may often technic-
ally be a sale between the club and one of its members.
This, of course, is not saying that an association which as
between its members is a club, cannot enter into business
Selling liquor or giving theatricals for money to outsiders
is just as much a business as if the profits were divided
among the members. On the other hand, it is not neces-
I Benjamin on Sales, Sect. 2, 6th Ed.
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sary that a club'should have a common room, etc. The
criterion depends on the association to furnish pleasure to
the members at cost. The kind of pleasure is immaterial.
The fact that liquor alone was furnished might be a sus-
picious circumstance which, taken with others, such as
that incidental profits went to the steward, would justify a
jury in looking at the "club" as a device to evade, the
license laws.' But if it is bona fide we see nothing in the
license laws of our own or other States to prevent men
combining together to purchase liquor and afterwards dis-
tributing the same at cost on a prearranged plan. That the
legislatures of our States could prevent the buying of
liquor in common by two or more people, or the subsequent
distribution without a license, may be admitted. But to
put such a strict interpretation on an Act would require
very plain language. If the legislature had thought it
necessary for a club to obtain a license they would have
enabled reputable clubs to obtain licenses. But in Penn-
sylvania, at least, by requiring an applicant to affirm that
no one besides himself is interested in the sale, and that
the place is necessary "for the accommodation of the
public," they have put it out of the power of clubs to
obtain licenses. Judge PENNYPACKER, in his able opinion,
has considered it extremely probable that the legislature
meant to require the members of a club when they wanted
to drink at the club, to send to the nearest tavern. But if
this is so, would it not look like legislation to encourage
the business of selling intoxicating liquors at retail?
Lastly, in interpreting license laws it seems to us that
courts sometimes forget, in their commendable eagerness
to give effect to legislation whose general object is meritori-
ous, that they are interpreting a criminal statute, frequently
making acts crimes which before were innocent, and that
one of the best rules of our law is, that such statutes should
be construed strictly. These words "construed strictly"
if they mean anything should prevent courts applying the
prohibitions of a penal statute to new and doubtful cases.
I Op. Com. v. Tierney, i Del. Rep., Pa., p. 22.
